Review of India After Gandhi by Ramachandra Guha

Ramachandra Guha’s India After Gandhi: The History of the World’s Largest Democracy is a vast work, about 750 pages of detailed narrative on the political, economic, and cultural history of India from 1947 to roughly 2006. Throughout the book, Guha places a special emphasis on a question that has been asked countless times by both domestic and foreign observers: why does India remain united and democratic? The number of divisions in India’s society is exponential: every combination of language, religion, caste, and class has at some point caused conflict during these sixty-odd years of the Indian state. Of the multiple answers Guha gives in the Epilogue, his most convincing answer is the early successes of the state. In its first two decades, India established strong institutions and political norms and was graced by articulate and charismatic leaders. Despite a decline in liberalism and in the integrity of India’s politicians and bureaucracy since the 1970s, India’s early accomplishments remain a beacon, preserving trust and pride in the republic.

Perhaps because he deems the accomplishments the early years of the Indian state so critical to India’s stability, Guha devotes a large chunk of the book to this early period. The first three parts—“Picking up the Pieces”, “Nehru’s India”, and “Shaking the Center”—cover what might be called the “honeymoon” phase of Indian democracy, from before independence to Prime Minister Nehru’s death in 1964. Whole chapters are devoted to the early successes of the state. One covers the almost unfathomable success in which India convinced basically every princely state in the region (even reluctant Kashmir) to join the new union (Ch. 3, “Apples in the Basket”). Another covers the drafting of the Constitution of India, which created a secular state, restrained by laws and institutions and committed to the rights of minorities (Ch. 6, “Ideas of India”). In this section, Guha highlights many of the early heroes like Jawaharlal Nehru, Vallabhbhai Patel, Rajendra Prasad, B. R. Ambedkar, K. M. Munshi, and the like, who, despite their disagreements, respected each other greatly and found compromise (p. 117-118). Some early successes of the Nehru years include the tradition of national, fair elections (the first elections, in 1952, are described in Chapter 7, “The Biggest Gamble in History”); the carving of proud linguistic states under the States Reorganization Commission (Ch. 9, “Redrawing the Map”); and the promotion of women’s and lower-caste rights under the Hindu Code (Ch. 11, “The Law and the Prophets”). Guha credits these accomplishments to the character of the early leaders: their commitment to ideals like democracy, modernization, social progress, non-communalismIn the Indian context, “communalism” refers to factional politics in favor of certain subclasses of the population: Hindus, Muslims, lower castes, etc.

, and rights of minorities, and above all their integrity and their willingness to work with and compromise with those holding opposing viewpoints.

The remainder of Indian history is perhaps a long and gradual decline in these early qualities that Guha reveres. This decline began in the period described in Part IV, “The Rise of Populism”, from 1964 to 1989, during most which Indira Gandhi and her son Rajiv Gandhi served as Prime Minister.

In several ways, Indira Gandhi began the erosion of democracy and the rule of law in India. In her foreign and domestic issues Mrs. Gandhi saw several successes, such as the Pakistani civil war, socialist legislation such as the nationalization of the banks and the derecognition of the princes, and the Green Revolution (p. 438, 442). Yet she soon started to undermine government institutions and democracy itself. Early on, she tried to control the Supreme Court and state Parliaments (p. 472). Later, she declared a two-year state of emergency, under which she ruled by decree, suspended freedom of the press, and jailed thousands of political opponents. In the process, she placed both her sons in government positions, and anointed her son Rajiv as her successor, starting a tradition of nepotism that would define Congress for the rest of the century. (When Mrs. Gandhi first became Prime Minister, she was chosen by Congress leaders, not hand-picked by her father Mr. Nehru.)

If Indira Gandhi eroded Nehru’s commitment to democracy, Rajiv Gandhi, in his short term from 1984 to 1989, similarly defied Nehru’s principle of non-communalism. In order to gain seats in the national Parliament, Mr. Gandhi courted rather than fought extremism. He cowed to the Muslim religious right in the Shah Bano issue in an attempt to gain that demographic’s favor (575). In addition, he likely pulled some strings in the Ayodhya temple court case in an attempt to gain support from Hindu nationalists (577).

Overall, Mrs. and Mr. Gandhi’s prime ministerships cast dramatic doubt upon the historic Congress party and gave longtime supporters reason to look elsewhere for the country’s leadership. Yet no opposing party—neither the short-lived Janata party nor long-existing parties such as the Jana Sangh, Communist, or Socialist parties—proved itself a deserving successor to Nehru’s Congress. As Congress’s commitment to non-communalism faded, party politics shifted toward short-term issues rather than consistent ideological positions. The failures of Congress under Mrs. and Mr. Gandhi contributed to the rise of the BJP in the 1990s and 2000s.

In the last part of the book, “A History of Events”, Guha covers events from 1989 to the time of his writing (roughly 2006). He organizes the section thematically, in chapters titled “Rights”, “Riots”, “Rulers”, “Riches”, and “A People’s Entertainments”. Throughout this period, the erosion of Nehruvian principles continued. As non-communalism faded, political Hindu nationalism became mainstream for the first time in Indian history. Hindu nationalism fueled a mass mobilization for the destruction of a mosque at the Hindu god Ram’s supposed birthplace in Ayodha in the late 1980s, and this movement itself fueled further Hindu nationalism. (As Guha wryly remarks, “a single holy spot in a single small town was able to accomplish what a ubiquitous holy animal could not”, referring to earlier Hindu nationalists’ failed attempts to rouse public opinion to ban cow slaughter (p. 625).) This was also reflected in the rise of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party, which eventually became powerful enough to gain control of Parliament from 1998 to 2004 (and 2013 to present, under Narendra Modi).As a chart that Guha includes shows, Congress vote share declined from 39.5% to 25-28% from 1989 to 2004, as BJP’s share rose from 11.5% to 20-25% (p. 655).

Violence between Hindus and Muslims, inspired by both the Kashmiri independence movement and the Ayodhya controversy, reached a peak in the 1990s and early 2000s. Corruption increased dramatically in both politicians and the Indian civil service.

Guha offers a few bright spots: the gains of economic liberalization spearheaded by Manmohan Singh (first as Finance Minister in the 1990s, and later as PM), which led to the creation of many successful Indian multinationals and a burgeoning software exports industry, the improvement in literacy in some states, and such. Yet ultimately the tone is foreboding. Guha concludes that today’s India is maybe only “phipty-phipty [fifty-fifty]”A humorous reference to the Bollywood actor Johnny Walker’s catchphrase, “Boss, phipty-phipty”.

a democracy (p. 738). Though free elections—what Guha calls “the hardware of democracy”—have not been compromised, the “software of democracy”—political parties, the bureaucracy, and the courts—has been corrupted (p. 738). Perhaps the nostalgia for India’s freedom movement and early leaders and the modern sense of disillusionment with today’s Indian state (as was iconically depicted in the 2006 Bollywood drama Rang De BasantiRang De Basanti. Directed by Rakesh Omprakash Mehra, 2006.

) is, more or less, justified.

Why, then, does India stay together? Guha’s most convincing response is the early achievements of the state:

In India, the sapling [of democracy] was planted by the nation’s founders, who lived long enough (and worked hard enough) to nurture it to adulthood. Those who came afterwards could disturb and degrade the tree of democracy but, try as they might, could not uproot or destroy it." (p. 745).

Early institutions, too, he argues, played a part. Guha praises India’s decision to retain inherited institutions from the British Raj like the Indian Civil Service (ICS) and the army, which still exist in some form today (p. 745-747). He also cites economic integration creating a “mutually reinforcing loop” of economic integration (including inter-state migration) causing nationalism, leading to further economic integration (p. 751).A recent, major development in this dimension was the standardized national VAT, called the Goods and Service Tax, signed by Parliament in late 2016.

Finally, Guha mentions the tendency of Bollywood cinema to blend cultures and unite audiences across India (p. 753). To my disappointment, Guha does not provide a hint of how the corrosive forces that threaten the Indian state might be contained, but that is probably too much to ask of the historian.

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Yet in addition to this first question, in the Prologue Guha presents a second “fundamental ambition”: “to pay proper respect to the social and political diversity of India” (p. 15). By focusing on Guha’s first question, I underemphasized the wealth of details that Guha provides on every aspect of Indian politics and society. Guha describes in excellent detail countless regional political leaders, separatist movements, religious and caste controversies, terrorist attacks, wars, treaties, droughts and disasters. Given the size and diversity of India, it would be remiss to give a history of India without including all the regional and local stories that, to most Indians, form more of their personal history than the politics of the Centre.

Part of why these aspects were so interesting to me is my personal connection to these events. All four of my grandparents saw the violence of Partition as they migrated from West Punjab (now Pakistan) to New Delhi in 1946-47 and stayed in refugee camps on the outskirts of Delhi, both of which Guha describes in depressing detail in Chapter 5 (“Refugees and the Republic”). The influx of Punjabi culture to Delhi that Guha describes is a result of migrants like my grandparents. My parents, too, witnessed many of the major events Guha describes as they grew up in the 1970s, ’80s, and early ’90s in New Delhi, such as the Sikh pogroms in Delhi following Indira Gandhi’s assassination, the wildly popular Ramayan television series, and the protests of the 1990 Mandal Commission reforms. I found reading about these stories, and even the stories I don’t have a personal connection to, extremely engaging and valuable.

Many of these smaller stories help to inform the broader themes of Guha’s narrative: giving examples of Centre–State conflicts that often lead to secessionism, depicting the economic and social conditions of rural India, demonstrating different ways that local governments dealt with some of India’s challenges, and showcasing the diversity of the country. Yet, for better or for worse, many of the stories do not cleanly fit into any greater narrative. Many are merely vignettes of life in different parts of this large country during the past sixty years, some of which might not interest every reader. To someone who hasn’t heard of these places, and is looking for a broad overview of Indian national politics, economics, and foreign policy, some of these sections may be a slog. Yet overall, Guha has made these sections engaging by combining narrative, primary sources, period newspapers, contemporary analysis by foreigners, and retrospectives from historians, economists, and political scientists. He effortlessly blends themes and trends into a primarily chronological narrative, which is often quite gripping.